ABSTRACT: This article presents a historical context for the current notion of macrocognition. The idea of macrocognition has precedents dating to the first decades of experimental psychology. The distinction between macrocognition and microcognition instantiates philosophical issues that contrast structuralism with functionalism (naturalism and holism). This is one of the thematic "pendulum swings" across the history of psychology. With regard to both experimentation and computational modeling, the issues that persist across history can be interpreted as cautionary tales, as constraints on methodologies, or as challenges.
Introduction
Terms may change and classifications may vary, but the terms of classification are always activities, and the terms employed-faculties, capacities, powers, operations, functions, etc.-all belong to the same logical universe.
-Edward B. Titchener (1929, p. 20) It is relatively easy to recognize mistakes of our predecessors. It is not as easy, lacking the perspective of history, to know whether we today are doing any better.
-George Miller (1986, p. 278) FROM A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, THE MICROCOGNITION-MACROCOGNITION DISTINCTION represents a polarity of views that has coursed through the history of psychology. From today' s perspective, the distinction presents novel challenges appropriate to the current time. Some may see tensions between macrocognition and computational cognitive modeling. In this brief historical account we show that macrocognition has a short history, with origins in modern cognitive systems engineering, academic psychology, and naturalistic decision making. But we also show that macrocognition has a long past-it has a precedent in earlier schools of thought, which themselves instantiated the lingering issues of human nature. As a history for macrocognition, this article is just an initial step. This article is a retrospective reconstruction of historical themes. Further historiographic analysis is certainly warranted. This article sets the stage for discussion of issues that are specifically pertinent to computational modeling. We present general claims about the prospects and limitations of computational macrocognitive modeling. We also point to methodological issues-specifically, the roles of naturalism and experimentalism.
As we recount the history, it will seem at times as if the primary constituent was contentious debate. The recent past notwithstanding, the rhetoric of decades long past was sometimes highly contentious and personal. Although we do not want our recounting of various claims and positions to be interpreted as advocacy for any of their particulars, we should come clean at the outset: We do see value and importance in the notions of macrocognition, and we feel it raises interesting and useful questions as well as challenges for modeling.
With regard to the longer history, readers might find the connection between cognitive engineering and 19th century German philosophy and logic to be remote. This article illuminates lingering issues that contextualize the modern discussions of computational macrocognitive modeling, such as those that appear in the other articles in this special issue. This is a history for macrocognition-perhaps a cautionary tale for computational modeling, perhaps the necessary bridge connecting the history to the current practice.
Macrocognition's Short History
There were two "first uses" of the term macrocognition, in the mid-1980s. One was at a conference sponsored by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1985 on intelligent decision support systems for process control. The second was in the writing of one of us (McNeese, 1986 ) about a "humane" approach to artificial intelligence. After these two first uses, there emerged a third strand. Without relying on the term macrocognition, central ideas were expressed by Alan Newell, James Jenkins, and George Miller in their mid-1980s discussions of the state of cognitive psychology. The use of the term macrocognition most recently, by advocates of the naturalistic decision making paradigm, has been intended to weave together the these strands.
Strand 1: The NATO Strand
The first published discussion of a distinction between micro-and macrolevels was in a presentation by Gunnar Johanssen at a 1985 NATO conference on decision support systems (Hollnagel, Mancini, & Woods, 1985 ). Johanssen, who was then at the Laboratory for Man-Machine Systems of the University of Kassel and a leader in the field of ecological psychology, distinguished between micro-and macrolevels in an analysis of decision making situations:
Decision making is required on all levels of social life and in all work situations. . . . The macro-operational situations are characterized by the need for decision making during such tasks as goal-setting, fault management, and planning in systems operations or maintenance of man-machine systems. . . . The micro-operations situations involve decision making as an ingredient of control processes, either manual or supervisory, in man-machine systems. (Johanssen, 1985, pp. 328-331) Although this is not quite the sense of macro/micro that is relied upon today, it is clearly pointing in the direction of looking at the phenomenology of cognitive work (see Klein et al., 2003) .
This notion of macrocognition was continued in Woods and Roth' s (1986) discussion of a hierarchy of decision-making situations-including organizational, microoperational, and macrooperational levels-in reference to process control for nuclear power. (See also Rasmussen, 1986.) Ten years later, Pietro Carlo Cacciabue and Erik Hollnagel (1995) contrasted macrocognition with microcognition in order to present a view for humanmachine systems design that would not take an information-processing approach. They argued for the description of cognitive functions that are performed in natural as opposed to laboratory settings:
Micro-cognition is here used as a way of referring to the detailed theoretical accounts of how cognition takes place in the human mind . . . the focus is on "mechanisms of intelligence" per se, rather than the way the human mind works. Micro-cognition is concerned with the building of theories for specific phenomena and with correlating the details of the theories with available empirical and experimental evidence. Typical examples of micro-cognition are studies of human memory, of problem solving in confined environments (for example, the Towers of Hanoi), of learning and forgetting in specific tasks, of language understanding, and so on. Many of the problems that are investigated are "real," in the sense that they correspond to problems that one may find in real-life situations-at least by name. But when they are studied in terms of micro-cognition the emphasis is more on experimental control than on external validity. . . . Macro-cognition refers to the study of the role of cognition in realistic tasks, that is in interacting with the environment. Macro-cognition only rarely looks at phenomena that take place exclusively within the human mind or without overt interaction. It is thus more concerned with human performance under actual working conditions than with controlled experiments. . . . The simulation of cognition can be defined as the replication, by means of computer programs, of the performance of a person in a selected set of situations. The minimum requirement is that it produces the response the person would give. (Cacciabue & Hollnagel, 1995, pp. 57-58) Thus, argued Cacciabue and Hollnagel, the forms taken by macrocognitive theories and microcognitive theories are different, with macrocognitive theories being unlike, for instance, information-processing flow diagrams or sets of procedural rules.
Strand 2: Humane Intelligence
The notion of humane intelligence emerged in U.S. Air Force research in the Cockpit Automation Technology (CAT) program and the Pilot' s Associate (PA) program. These programs had a "cognitive liaison" (Michael McNeese) from the Air Force Research Laboratory, a role that required interdisciplinary synthesis across several sets of complex technologies that were constantly evolving as new missions and capability requirements emerged. In the case of the CAT program it was critical to evaluate the interplay among automation, cockpit display and controls, cognition, and context. The emphasis for liaising in the PA program was to work with computer scientists and artificial intelligence experts to figure out how to "knowledge engineer" the human into a newfangled cockpit that had intelligent capabilities.
The work with CAT and PA (McNeese, Warren, & Woodson, 1985) led to some theoretical ruminations about what are today called joint cognitive systems or the approach of human-centered computing, such as the notion that technology has to be usable, useful, and understandable and the notion that that a goal for technology is to extend human capabilities. McNeese (1986) suggested the term humane intelligence to express a vision of how humans, automation, intelligent systems, and contextual variation could work together if the technology functioned in a way that is complementary to human intentions. This could not be accomplished, argued McNeese (2006) , if research continued relying on the "replacement logic" approach of that era.
McNeese (1986) argued that macrocognitive awareness on the part of artificial intelligences would be necessary. By this, McNeese meant that the automation and the artificial intelligences would meaningfully be tied to the contextual or "total information sense-surround" and would provide to the human information about the constantly changing conditions that have to be recognized, synthesized, and acted upon (situational awareness). He referred specifically to the artificial intelligence systems aboard fighter planes as "adaptive human-system relationships": "A macro-awareness and macro-cognition must be provided that will obviate such conditions as channelized attention, spatial disorientation, and cognitive overload, as well as providing a perspicacious insight" (McNeese, 1986, p. 6) .
In the same timeframe (1984) (1985) (1986) , there were a number of U.S. Air Force research programs in command, control, and intelligence. These were also integrating people with information and technology-a synthesis requiring decision aids that could assist teams with their cognitive performance (see McNeese, 1998) . As the CAT and PA programs were assessing team performance in large command posts, it was clear that many of the problems that were being experienced in the command and control projects fell into the macrocognitive realm. One of the early projects involved integrating the use of large group displays and video technologies with human factors and decision-making considerations in command posts (McNeese, 1986) . As part of this research effort, the existing theories of team decision making and cognition were examined in light of studies of actual work practice. This again emphasized how important context was when considering decision aids in complex, emergent situations. It also reinforced the sense that macrocognition goes beyond the traditional human information-processing paradigm. Applied researchers were not the only ones who were developing such ideas. There was a third strand, in academic psychology.
Strand 3: The Newell-Jenkins-Miller Plea
In his classic paper, "You Can't Play 20 Questions With Nature and Win," Alan Newell (1973) meditated on the progress of cognitive psychology, arguing that it had devolved into a set of laboratory paradigms and countless experiments varying the themes. Experimentation sometimes uncovers fascinating and important psychological phenomena, but the list grows longer and longer without converging. As the number of variables that must be considered increases, the complexity explodes. Eventually, researchers tire of a topic and move on, only for a subsequent generation to rediscover the root phenomenon and launch a new wave of clever experiments.
In another classic article, "Remember that Old Theory of Memory? Well, Forget It!" James J. Jenkins (1974) argued similarly that the psychology of verbal behavior had restricted its reach and scope and needed to go beyond its associationist legacy. Speaking of a paradigm in which he himself was a leader, he wrote:
Unexamined beliefs and attitudes directed and limited our research and theory in many ways. . . . [Associationism] justified a concern with simple units and relations and sanctioned experiments on such units in the faith that they would eventually add up to the complex behaviors of language. This view is so pervasive that it is almost coextensive with being an experimental psychologist. . . . An alternative position [contextualism] . . . . alters the way we interpret phenomena, emphasizing the importance of natural problems and realistic methodology, and changes what counts as an explanation. . . . This means that being a psychologist is going to be much more difficult than we used to think it to be. And it means that the domain of experimentation and experimental methodology will have to be criticized more intently than we thought necessary before. (Jenkins, 1974, pp. 785-787) Research by Jenkins and his students had shown phenomena of gist recognition and transfer-appropriate processing. In a nutshell, "Memory is not a box in a flow diagram" (Jenkins, 1974, p. 794 ; see also Hoffman & Nead, 1983) . The radical change in Jenkins' s viewpoint, from associationist to contextualist, is: threatening because it seems to demand an understanding of all the "higher mental processes" at once . . . we cannot deal with memory without dealing with instructions, perception, comprehension, inference, problem solving, and all the other processes that contribute to the construction of events. (Jenkins, 1974, p. 794) And finally, Jenkins pointed to the matter of the ecological validity and representativeness of laboratory research:
You should notice that methodological issues and the choices of experimental paradigms become crucial when you take [this] view. . . . A whole theory of an experiment can be elaborated without contributing in an important way to the science because the situation is artificial and non-representative in just the senses that determine its particular phenomena. (Jenkins, 1974, p. 794) In hindsight, Jenkins' s argument in favor of contextualism is similar to McNeese' s (1986 McNeese' s ( , 2006 argument in favor of holism. And completing this trio is a less cited but critically important paper by George Miller titled "Dismembering Cognition" (1986) . Miller summarized Newell' s (1973) argument but placed the issues in a broader historical context. Miller lamented a number of ways in which cognition had been dismembered. One of these is "dismemberment by experimentation":
Analysis is the scientific reflex: When you want to understand something, take it apart. . . . Faculties, ideas, images, beliefs, and information processes have all enjoyed their day as conceptual atoms. (Miller, 1986, p. 277) The strategy of studying one cognitive process at a time is a risky business, indeed, yet studying everything at the same time is impossible. . . . Given an interesting phenomenon [the experimental psychologist' s] first impulse is to reduce it to something uninteresting. (Miller, 1986, p. 281) Miller did not hesitate to reflect critically upon his own work:
I have on occasion committed a few chronometries myself. . . . [A] microgenetic analysis of processes into successive stages . . . does not provide theoretical alternatives to the processes themselves. The danger is that a highly successful method can tempt the unwary to assume either that theory is unnecessary or that, if enough facts are piled up in one place, a theory explaining what they mean will eventually become self-evident. (Miller, 1986, p. 290) In the plea with which he concluded the paper, Miller (1986) reinforced ideas that are central to the notion of macrocognition. First, he emphasized the point that mental processes are continuous and interacting:
[Even] granted the traditional analysis into processes, nobody seems to know how to put them back together. If one gives credence to the pre-theoretical concept of the mental act, surely then one would also grant that any interesting exemplar would comprise all these cognitive processes working together to accomplish some coherent result. (Miller, 1986, p. 281) In a holistic system, anything can interact with anything else, and everything interacts with something else. . . . Laws governing the reconstruction of the whole from its parts are too often neglected. (Miller, 1986, pp. 294-295) Second, Miller (1986) offered suggestions as to how cognitive science might avoid what Koch (1981) had called "analytical pathology":
Relentless devotion to a single experimental technique has always spelled trouble in psychology, whether it was threshold measurement, conditioning, rote memorization, factor analysis, or projection tests. Each is a good technique in itself but when it becomes the focus of an ever-narrowing pursuit of details, when the results prove useless outside the laboratory . . . then its sterility becomes apparent. (Miller, 1986, p. 290) [P]sychology' s scientific progress has generally followed the rejection or abandonment of ill-advised attempts at analysis. Recovery from analytic pathology is a repeating theme in the history of psychology. (Miller, 1986, p. 295) [On] those rare occasions when the enterprise has been saved by theoretical insights, they have almost always been synthetic insights, proposals that broke out of the prevailing analytic categories and forced reconsideration of mental life in broader terms. . . . Never relax the criteria of evidence that set experimental psychology apart, but avoid methodolatry. . . . Cherish interesting hypotheses that ignore the usual boundaries between cognitive processes. . . . Cherish theories that envision integration as well as analysis. (Miller, 1986, pp. 295-296) .
This theme echoes the works of Jenkins (1974) and Newell (1973) , who also acknowledged the importance of experimentation and converging operations, but who also cautioned researchers to avoid reliance on single paradigms, and encouraged studies of mental life in its natural complexity.
To summarize, in the mid-1980s the notion of macrocognition consisted of the following assertions:
• the Johanssen-Woods assertion that cognitive work can only be understood through study at a number of levels or perspectives (Johanssen, 1985; Woods & Roth, 1986 ); • the Cacciabue and Hollnagel (1995) assertion that an information-processing approach provides an incomplete understanding of cognitive work; • the McNeese (1986) assertion of a goal for cognitive engineering, the creation of humane intelligence; and • the Newell-Jenkins-Miller plea that researchers be open to the study of real-world complexity and not rely exclusively on reductionist approaches (Jenkins, 1974; Miller, 1986; Newell, 1973) .
Strand 4: Naturalistic Decision Making
The prime motive of Klein et al. (2003) was to propose the concept of macrocognition as an encompassing frame for studying the cognitive processes that emerged in complex settings. For some years there had been discussion (and consensus) about the fact that the study of naturalistic decision making was not just about decision making. (This was not the first time that a community of practice had adopted a name appropriate for its time but that, in course, became a reminder of its historical baggage.) Klein et al. (2003) argued that macrocognition and microcognition are complementary and necessary aspects of applied cognitive science, motivating a dialog between laboratory and field researchers. Like Cacciabue and Hollnagel (1995) , Klein et al. (2003) defined macrocognition as the study of complex cognitive functions, including decision making, situation awareness, planning, problem detection, option generation, mental simulation, attention management, uncertainty management, and expertise. In other words, it was suggested that macrocognition is what naturalistic decision making is really about, after all.
At the 2007 International Conference on Naturalistic Decision Making, Jim Staszewski of Carnegie Mellon University called the question and provided the answer:
Is macrocognition not just those things that Newell, Jenkins, and Miller had been arguing since the mid-1980s? Yes, it is. But if those leading scientists could make these arguments and yet the field as a whole continued unabated on its path, then perhaps the old wine needs a new bottle. (Staszewski, 2007, n.p.) So much for the short history.
Macrocognition's Long Past
According to George Miller' s (1986) account of the history of cognitive psychology, in the 1700s it was proposed that the fundamental faculties of the soul are understanding, feeling, and will. In the 1800s, cognitive states and processes were analyzed into perceptual faculties (themselves decomposed into several sensory faculties) and intellectual faculties decomposed into memory, imagination, attention, reason, and judgment (Miller, 1986, p. 285) . After that, the emphasis of scholars shifted from faculty psychology to associationism, when association was presented as a single unifying process (as in the writings of John Stuart Mill, 1843). Macrocognition of today seems to represent a return to a faculty psychology. As we will show, macrocognition also can be seen as a form of act psychology.
The current idea of micro-versus macrocognition can be regarded as a manifestation of one of the pendulum swings that characterizes the history of psychology. Specifically, this is the contrast of reductionist approaches patterned after physical laboratory sciences versus "holistic" approaches through phenomenological or observational inquiry. This places macrocognition as a form of act psychology, but it also links macrocognition to American functionalism.
The Psychology of Franz Brentano
Wilhelm Wundt, generally regarded as the prime founder of experimental psychology, had a sense of mission-to found psychology as a science (Naturwissenschaft). But that goal was shared by Franz Brentano (1838-1917; Figure 1 ). Brentano was born near Zurich and educated in classical philosophy and theology at the universities at Zurich and Berlin. He taught at a number of universities, especially at Würzburg.
Like Wundt (1873) , Brentano sought a psychology grounded in observation, but whereas Wundt' s theories were based on an appeal to experimentation and his research was inclined more toward neural and sensory physiology, Brentano' s theories were based on an appeal to naturalistic observation of mental phenomena ("phenomenology") and to logic (i.e., rationalism). (It should be noted, however, that Brentano did conduct laboratory experiments, including extensive studies of color vision.) For Brentano, key problems of psychology were to describe and explain the phenomena of conscious experience (Geistesphänomenen), especially intentionality (see Chisholm, 1952) . In Brentano one can find much grist for the philosopher' s mill on issues such as the relations of thoughts (inner speech) to symbols and signs (B. Terrell, personal communication, 1979) .
Brentano (1874/1995) discussed at length a notion called "intentional inexistence" in his classically inspired terminology. In a widely cited passage, Brentano explained it thus:
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object. . . . In presentation something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. This intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. . . . We could, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves. (Brentano, 1874 (Brentano, /1995 In modern jargon, some of Brentano' s (1874/1995) concepts seem close to what is meant by mental representation (Vorstellung). But in contrast with representationalist views, in Brentano' s psychology thought is not to be explained in terms of mental contents (mental objects or Gegenstand). Brentano sought the explanation of mental phenomena in terms of intentional acts, such as inferring, believing, doubting, denying, affirming, and intuitive induction. To Brentano, the inner perception of mental contents occurs only through intentional acts of judgment (Urteil), and it is the acts of judgment that were his focus, not the contents of thoughts per se. "The differences between the various fundamental classes of intentional phenomena are to be assigned to the ways in which they refer to their objects and not what they refer to" (B. Terrell, personal communication, 1979) . For example, the experience of a mental image of a unicorn is not a decomposable object-like thing but an act that affirms the form of a hypothetical object and its relations of reference.
Brentano (1874/1995) referred to "phenomenological introspection" to distinguish his method from Wundt' s (1873) method of "self-observation" (Selbstbeobachtung). In Brentano' s psychology it is not possible for there to be a distinct process of introspection, defined as the perception of one' s own thoughts.
Brentano argued that what one might call introspections are actually judgments that are secondary references to memories. This capsule view of Brentano' s (1874/1995) philosophy might seem remote, showing merely that Brentano was as much concerned with philosophical questions of ontology and logic as he was with psychology. Brentano did leave a significant legacy for all of analytic philosophy, including the view of logic as the rules for proper judgment rather than as normative laws of thought, as John Stuart Mill (1843) had argued. Brentano' s student Kazimierz Twardowski started the thread leading to modern logic, carried forward by his own student Alfred Tarski, whose theories expanded upon the notion of logic as a rational reconstruction of language (see Terrell, 1976 Terrell, , 1977 .
Brentano also left a significant legacy for scientific psychology (Spiegelberg, 1960) . His ideas impacted all of the prominent scholars in 1800s philosophy and psychology, including Sigmund Freud. Edmund Husserl, who founded the school of existential phenomenology, was a Brentano student, as were Christian von Ehrenfels, who introduced the notion of the perceptual "Gestalt," and Carl Stumpf, who was teacher to the founders of Gestalt psychology (Max Wertheimer, Wolfgang Kohler, and Kurt Koffka).
What is most important for the notion of macrocognition is Brentano' s articulation of a psychology of mental acts. Brentano' s idea of an act psychology was laid out in his major work, "Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint" (1874/1995). The focus is on what the mind does-thinking, judging, sensing, inferring, and so forth-not what it contains (structuralist designations of sensations, memories, inferences, and so forth). The mind is populated by activities, not things, and mental phenomena are described using verbs, not nouns (Chisholm & Haller, 1978) .
Here one can begin to see the emerging contrast: One pole is the reductionisticstructuralistic-experimentalist approach, the other is that of act psychology-Gestalt psychology. The latter is often referred to as the "Würzburg school" because researchers at that university (e.g., Karl Bühler) carried the Brentano-Stumpf legacy forward in their studies of "higher mental processes."
What remained was for someone to throw down a gauntlet.
Edward B. Titchener (1867 Titchener ( -1927 This British-born student of Wilhelm Wundt, having a career primarily at Cornell University in the United States, penned a notable little book titled Systematic Psychology in which he systematically compared Brentano' s (1874/1995) Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint and Wundt' s (1873) Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie (Principles of Physiological Psychology), asking, "Which of these two books holds the key to a science of psychology?" (Titchener, 1929, p. 20) .
The first column in Table 1 presents the holists' critiques of structuralism, expressed in passages selected from Titchener (1929) , historian of psychology and Titchener student Edwin Boring (1950) , and William James (1884), who often mentioned his resonance to Brentano' s (1874/1995) work and ideas. The second column in Table 1 hints at Titchener' s (1929) polemic against holism, in which he makes his own allegiance clear. Table 2 expresses the contrast formally.
Conclusion:Back to the Present
One might justifiably consider macrocognition to be a modern act psychology, a modern functionalism, or a modern contextualism. But it is more than the sum of these because it is appropriate for its day. 
